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We present a general framework to describe the evolutionary dynamics of an arbitrary number of types in
finite populations based on stochastic differential equations (SDE). For large, but finite populations this allows
to include demographic noise without requiring explicit simulations. Instead, the population size only rescales
the amplitude of the noise. Moreover, this framework admits the inclusion of mutations between different types,
provided that mutation rates, µ, are not too small compared to the inverse population size 1/N . This ensures
that all types are almost always represented in the population and that the occasional extinction of one type does
not result in an extended absence of that type. For µN ≪ 1 this limits the use of SDE’s, but in this case there
are well established alternative approximations based on time scale separation. We illustrate our approach by
a Rock-Scissors-Paper game with mutations, where we demonstrate excellent agreement with simulation based
results for sufficiently large populations. In the absence of mutations the excellent agreement extends to small
population sizes.
PACS numbers: 87.23.-n, 89.65.-s 02.50.Ey
I. INTRODUCTION
Populations evolve when different individuals have differ-
ent traits or strategies that determine their reproductive suc-
cess. In population genetic models, this success is typically
constant, whereas in evolutionary game theory the fitness of
an individual depends on interactions with other members of
the population. Consequently, fitness depends on the rela-
tive proportions (or frequencies) of different strategic types
and hence gives rise to so called frequency dependent selec-
tion. More successful strategies increase in abundance and
may either take over the entire population or, as the strategy
becomes increasingly common, may suffer from a decrease in
fitness, which can result in the co-existence of two or more
traits within the population. For example, in host-parasite co-
evolution, a rare parasite may be most successful, but once
it reaches high abundance, selection pressure on the host in-
creases and the host is likely to develop some defense mech-
anism. Consequently, the success of the parasite decreases.
Such dynamics can be conveniently described by evolution-
ary game theory [1–6].
Traditionally, the mathematical description of evolutionary
game dynamics is formulated in terms of the deterministic
replicator equation [2]. This implies that population sizes
are infinite and populations are unstructured. Only more
recently the stochastic dynamics in finite populations at-
tracted increasing attention [7, 8]. Typically, the stochastic
approach becomes deterministic in the limit of infinite
populations. For large, but finite populations the dynamics
can be approximated by stochastic differential equations
(SDE) [8–10]. This analytic approach is a natural extension
of the replicator dynamics, which is capable of bridging
the gap between deterministic models and individual based
simulations. Moreover, SDE’s are typically computationally
far less expensive than simulations because the execution
time does not scale with population size.
II. MASTER EQUATION
In unstructured, finite populations of constant size, N , con-
sisting of d distinct strategic types and with a mutation rate, µ,
evolutionary changes can be described by the following class
of birth-death processes: In each time step, one individual of
type j produces a single offspring and displaces another ran-
domly selected individual of type k. With probability 1 − µ,
no mutation occurs and j produces an offspring of the same
type. But with probability µ, the offspring of an individual
of type i (i 6= j) mutates into a type j individual. This re-
sults in two distinct ways to increase the number of j types
by one at the expense of decreasing the number of k types by
one, hence keeping the population size constant. Biologically,
keeping N constant implies that the population has reached
a stable ecological equilibrium and assumes that this equilib-
rium remains unaffected by trait frequencies. The probability
for the event of replacing a type k individual with a type j
individual is denoted by Tkj and is a function of the state of
the populationX = (X1, X2, . . . Xd), with Xn indicating the
number of individuals of type n such that
∑d
n=1Xn = N .
For this process it is straight forward to write down a
Master equation [10] and, at this point, there is no need to
further specify the transition probabilities Tkj .
P τ+1(X)=P τ(X)+
d∑
j,k=1
P τ (Xkj )Tkj(X
k
j )−P τ (X)Tjk(X))
(1)
where P τ (X) denotes the probability of being in state X at
time τ and Xkj = (X1, . . .Xj − 1, . . .Xk + 1, . . .Xd) repre-
sents a state adjacent to X .
2III. FOKKER-PLANCK AND LANGEVIN EQUATIONS
While the Master equation (1) is rather unwieldy, a
Kramers-Moyal expansion yields a convenient approximation
for large but finite N in the form of a Fokker-Planck equation
[11]
ρ˙(x) = −
d−1∑
k=1
∂
∂xk
ρ(x)Ak(x) + 1
2
d−1∑
j,k=1
∂2
∂xk∂xj
ρ(x)Bjk(x)
(2)
where x = X/N represents the state of the population in
terms of frequencies of the different strategic types and ρ(x)
is the probability density in state x. Due to the normalization∑d
k=1 xk = 1, it suffices to consider d − 1 elements of the
deterministic drift vector Ak(x), k = 1, . . . d − 1. Similarly,
we only need to consider a diffusion matrix Bjk(x) with di-
mension (d − 1)× (d − 1), i.e. j, k = 1, . . . d − 1. The drift
vectorAk(x) is given by
Ak(x) =
d∑
j=1
(
Tjk(x)− Tkj(x)
)
= −1 +
d∑
j=1
Tjk(x). (3)
For the second equality we have used
∑d
j=1 Tkj(x) = 1,
which simply states that a k-type individual transitions to
some other type (including staying type k) with probability
one. Ak(x) is bounded in [−1, d − 1] because the Tjk are
probabilities.
The diffusion matrix Bjk(x) is defined as
Bjk(x) = − 1
N
[Tjk(x) + Tkj(x)] for j 6= k (4a)
Bjj(x) = 1
N

 d∑
l=1,l 6=j
(
Tjl(x) + Tlj(x)
) . (4b)
For a detailed derivation see e.g. [10] or [12]. Note that the
diffusion matrix is symmetric, Bjk(x) = Bkj(x) and van-
ishes as ∼ 1/N in the limit N → ∞. Moreover, we have for
all diagonal elements Bjj(x) ≥ 0 and for the non-diagonal el-
ements Bjk(x) ≤ 0. Note that Tjj(x) cancels in Eq. (3) and
does not appear in Eq. (4) – it is thus of no further concern.
The noise of our underlying process is uncorrelated in time
and hence the Itoˆ calculus [11] can be applied to derive a
Langevin equation, which represents in our case a stochastic
replicator-mutator equation,
x˙k = Ak(x) +
d−1∑
j=1
Ckj(x)ξj(t) (5)
where the ξj(t) represent uncorrelated Gaussian white noise
with unit variance, 〈ξk(t)ξj(t′)〉 = δkjδ(t − t′). The matrix
C(x) is defined by CT (x)C(x) = B(x) and its off-diagonal
elements are responsible for correlations in the noise of dif-
ferent strategic types.
Fluctuations arising in finite populations are approximated
by the stochastic term in the Langevin equation (5). For given
transition probabilities the matrix C(x) provides a quantita-
tive description of the fluctuations introduced by microscopic
processes in finite populations. In the limit N → ∞ the ma-
trix C(x) vanishes with ∼ 1/√N and we recover a deter-
ministic replicator mutator equation. Note that the replicator
equation does not impose an upper or lower bound on A (c.f.
Eq. (3)). However, this difference merely amounts to a (con-
stant) rescaling of time.
The multiplicative character of the noise and its strategy-
strategy correlations are determined by the form of the ma-
trix C(x). In order to determine C(x), we first diagonalize
B(x). Because B(x) is real and symmetric it is diagonaliz-
able by an orthogonal matrix U(x) with U(x)UT (x) = 1,
where 1 denotes the identity matrix. Moreover, the normal-
ized eigenvectors f i(x) of B(x) form an orthonormal basis,
f i(x) · f j(x) = δij . Thus, we can construct the trans-
formation matrix U(x) = (f1(x), . . . ,fd−1(x)) such that
B(x) = U(x)Λ(x)UT (x) where Λ(x) is a diagonal matrix
with the eigenvalues λi(x) of B(x) along its diagonal. From
Eq. (4) follows that B(x) is positive definite and hence all
eigenvalues λi(x) are positive. Here, we tacitly assume that
all Tjk are nonzero; if certain transitions are excluded, B(x)
is positive semidefinite and eigenvalues can be zero.
Finally, our matrix C(x) is given by
C(x) = U(x) ·


√
λ1 . . . 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 . . .
√
λd−1

 · UT (x). (6)
This standard procedure to diagonalize matrices can be eas-
ily implemented numerically. However, the diffusion matrix
B(x) obviously depends on the transition probabilities and
thus on the abundances of all strategies. Consequently, the
procedure to calculate C(x) must be continuously repeated as
time progresses and the state x changes. This is computa-
tionally inconvenient and therefore, it is desirable to calculate
C(x) analytically.
The simplest case with d = 2 strategic types results in a
one-dimensional Fokker-Planck equation [8]. Moreover, in
special cases, for example in cyclic games such as the sym-
metric Rock-Scissors-Paper game, the Fokker-Planck equa-
tion (2) can be approximated in polar coordinates [13]. How-
ever, such cases are non-generic and here we focus on general,
higher dimensional situations with d ≥ 3. As a particular ex-
ample to illustrate the framework numerically, we provide a
detailed analysis of a generic Rock-Scissors-Paper game.
IV. MULTIPLICATIVE NOISE FOR SPECIFIC
PROCESSES
In general, the diffusion matrix B(x) depends not only on
the frequencies x but also on the payoffs (fitness) of the dif-
ferent strategic types. In this case, an analytic representation
of C(x) is only of limited use because it would be valid just
for one particular game. However, B(x) becomes payoff in-
dependent if Tjk(x) + Tkj(x) is payoff independent. Fortu-
nately, this holds for the broad and relevant class of pairwise
3comparison processes. In these processes, a focal individual
f and a model m with payoffs pif and pim are picked at ran-
dom and a payoff comparison determines whether the focal
individual switches its strategy.
Let γ(pif , pim) be the probability that the focal individual
adopts the strategy of the model (see e.g. [14, 15]) and as-
sume that every mutation leads to a different strategy. Then
the transition probabilities from type k to type j read
Tkj(x) = (1 − µ)xkxjγ(pij , pik) + µxk 1
d− 1 (7)
for j 6= k. Consequently, any pairwise comparison process
with
γ(pij , pik) + γ(pik, pij) = const. (8)
leads to a payoff independent diffusion matrix B(x). If
Eq. (8) is fulfilled, the noise term in Eq. (5) is independent
of the evolutionary game. In particular, it allows the con-
sideration of multi-player games in which the payoff func-
tions are non-linear [16]. Examples for evolutionary processes
that fulfill Eq. (8) include the local update process [8] with
γ(pij , pik) =
1
2
+w(pij−pik) wherew indicates the strength of
selection acting on payoff differences between different strate-
gic types. For w ≪ 1 selection is weak, payoff differences
amount to little changes in fitness and the process is domi-
nated by random updating. For larger w selection strength
increases but an upper limit is imposed on w by the require-
ment 0 ≤ γ(pij , pik) ≤ 1. Another example is the Fermi pro-
cess [17–19] with γ(pij , pik) = (1 + exp[−w(pij − pik)])−1.
Again w indicates the selection strength but without an upper
bound. In the limit w → ∞, i.e. γ(pij , pik) = Θ [pij − pik]
where Θ[x] denotes the Heavyside step function, the imita-
tion dynamics [20, 21] is recovered. A further example, where
γ(pij , pik) does not simply depend on the difference between
its arguments, is γ(pij , pik) = pijpij+pik [7, 22]. Incidentally, all
examples above satisfy γ(pij , pik) + γ(pik, pij) = 1 but, for
example, there might be resilience to change in the local up-
date process such that γ(pij , pik) = α
(
1
2
+ w(pij − pik)
)
with
0 < α < 1 and hence γ(pij , pik) + γ(pik, pij) = α < 1.
Last but not least, an example of an important process that
does not lead to a payoff independent B(x), is given by the
standard frequency dependent Moran process [7, 23, 24] or its
linearized equivalent [12, 25].
In the following, we concentrate on cases with γ(pij , pik) +
γ(pik, pij) = 1. This leads to
Bjk(x)= 1
N
[
−xjxk(1− µ)− µ
d− 1(xj + xk)
]
for j 6= k
(9)
and
Bjj(x)= 1
N
[
xj(1− xj)(1− µ) + µ
d− 1(1 + xj(d− 2))
]
.
(10)
Unfortunately, even in this case, a full derivation of C(x) is
difficult for general d. Thus, we focus on the more manage-
able but highly illustrative case of d = 3. Henceforth, we set
x1 = x and x2 = y (and x3 = 1− x− y) for convenience.
FIG. 1. (Color online) Elements of the noise matrix C(x, y, z) for
processes fulfilling Eq. (8) with d = 3 strategies for µ = 0 (left) and
µ > 0 (right). a The element Cxx determines how the noise in the
x-direction affects the x-coordinate. In the case of µ = 0, this noise
vanishes for x→ 0. For y → 0 and z → 0 we recover the usual mul-
tiplicative noise from one-dimensional evolutionary processes [8]. b
For nonvanishing mutations Cxx increases at x → 0 and x → 1 and
exceeds the value 1
2
√
N
(contour line) in the interior of the simplex,
which is the maximum value without mutations. The element Cyy
follows from the transformation x ↔ y. c The element Cxy deter-
mines how the noise in the x-direction affects the y-coordinate (or
vice versa). This term is always negative, as explained in the text.
For x→ 0 or y → 0, Cxy vanishes in the case of µ = 0. For z → 0,
we find Cxy = −Cxx, which ensures that the sum of the noise in
the x-coordinate, Cxx + Cxy, vanishes on this edge of the simplex:
If the noise increases x for z = 0 it has to decrease y by the same
amount. d In the case of µ > 0, the noise no longer vanishes at the
boundaries of the simplex but the expressions are too cumbersome to
display explicitly.
A. No mutations, µ = 0
For d = 3 and in the absence of mutations, we can give a
relatively compact analytic expression for C(x),
B(x) = 1
N
(
x(1 − x) −xy
−xy y(1− y)
)
. (11)
The eigenvalues of this matrix are
λ±(x) =
K+ ± L
2N
, (12)
4where K± = x(1 − x) ± y(1− y) and L =
√
K2− + 4x2y2.
The eigenvectors are given by
f±(x) =
1
N (−K− ± L, 2xy) , (13)
where N =
√
4x2y2 + (−K− ± L)2 is a normalization fac-
tor. From this, it is straightforward to construct the trans-
formation matrix U(x) = (f+(x),f−(x)). The product
U(x)√Λ(x) UT (x) then yields our matrix C(x), which can
be written as
Cxx(x) = 1√
2N


√
Q+−
1 +
(
2xy
Q
−−
)2 +
√
Q++
1 +
(
2xy
Q
−+
)2

 (14a)
Cxy(x) = Cyx = xy√
2NL
(√
Q+− −
√
Q++
)
(14b)
Cyy(x) = 1√
2N


√
Q+−
1 +
(
2xy
Q
−+
)2 +
√
Q++
1 +
(
2xy
Q
−−
)2

 (14c)
where Q±± = K± ± L. It is obvious that Cxx(x) ≥ 0 and
Cyy(x) ≥ 0. Since L ≥ 0, we have Q++ ≥ Q+− and there-
fore Cxy(x) ≤ 0. It is remarkable that even for this sim-
ple B(x), the matrix C(x) already takes a rather complicated
form that is not easy to interpret. Therefore, the elements
Cxx(x) and Cxy(x) are plotted in Fig. 1. The remaining el-
ement, Cyy(x), follows from the symmetry of the matrix, i.e.
in Fig. 1 a, b the simplex needs to be mirrored along the ver-
tical axis x = y. Recall that the matrix C(x) is independent
of the evolutionary game that is played and does not depend
on the microscopic evolutionary process, as long as Eq. (8),
γ(pij , pik) + γ(pik, pij) = const., holds. While analytical cal-
culations of C are also, in principle, feasible for d = 4 and
d = 5, they lead to very lengthy expressions.
B. With mutations, µ > 0
The procedure to derive C(x) remains the same when in-
cluding mutations just starting with
B(x) = 1− µ
N
(
x(1− x) −xy
−xy y(1− y)
)
+
µ
2N
(
1+ x −x− y
−x− y 1+ y
)
. (15)
Unfortunately, the analytic expressions for the elements of
C(x) grow to unwieldy proportions. A graphical illustration
of the elements of C(x) for µ > 0 is shown in Fig. 1. Com-
pared to µ = 0, the entries of Cxx(x) become larger and the
noise terms no longer vanish at the boundaries. For example,
at the corners of the simplex we have for Cxx(x)
Cxx(1, 0, 0) = 3√
10
√
µ
N
Cxx(0, 1, 0) =
√
2
5
√
µ
N
Cxx(0, 0, 1) = 1√
2
√
µ
N
For Cxy(x), we obtain at these points
Cxy(1, 0, 0) = Cxy(0, 1, 0) = − 1√
10
√
µ
N
Cxy(0, 0, 1) = 0.
In addition, the functional form of the noise term is altered
with increasing µ and becomes significantly more complex
than in the case of no mutations, µ = 0.
For µ > 0 it is important to mention that for small mutation
rates serious mathematical intricacies arise in the vicinity of
absorbing boundaries and saddle-node fixed points [26, 27].
Intuitively, the reason for these complications arises from the
diffusion approximation that underlies the derivation of the
Fokker-Planck equation (2). In systems with such absorb-
ing boundaries (or sub-spaces where one or more strategic
types are absent) finite populations spend non-negligible time
on these boundaries in the limit µ ≪ 1/N . In contrast, the
diffusion approximation is based on a continuum approxima-
tion, which reflects the limit N → ∞, and adds finite size
corrections for large, finite N . For example, the state of the
population x is a continuous variable and hence can be lo-
cated arbitrarily close to a boundary in both the Fokker-Planck
or Langevin formalisms, Eq. (2) and Eq. (5), but this is im-
possible in finite populations. More specifically, this implies
that the case of µ ≪ 1/N , for which the population could
get trapped on an absorbing boundary for an extended period
of time, cannot be captured by the diffusion approximation.
Consequently, the quality of the approximation is expected to
decrease for small µ > 0 and to get worse if N is small too.
Interestingly, this failure of the continuum approximation has
not been raised in population genetics, where similar consid-
erations have been made, but typically the description is only
made on the level of the Fokker-Planck equation and not based
on stochastic differential equations [28]. However, population
geneticists are typically interested in simpler scenarios, where
each type has a fixed fitness. In this case, the corresponding
deterministic system has no generic trajectories that are close
to absorbing boundaries. Moreover, the usual diffusion ap-
proximation in population genetics, where the selection inten-
sity scales to zero while the population size diverges, leads to
substantial noise, such that these effects have a minor impact.
For evolutionary games with small mutation rates one is
typically not forced to apply this relatively complex approxi-
mation. Instead, a time scale separation between mutation and
selection allows to approximate the dynamics based on a pair-
wise consideration of strategies by considering an embedded
Markov chain over the (quasi absorbing) homogenous states
of the population [29–33].
5V. APPLICATION TO THE ROCK-PAPER-SCISSORS
GAME
To compare our approach based on stochastic differential
equations in d− 1 dimensions to individual based simulations
with d strategies, we focus on the case of d = 3 where we
have obtained closed analytical results above for µ = 0. As
an example, we consider the cyclic dynamics in the Rock-
Scissors-Paper-Game, which is not only a popular children’s
game, but also relevant in biological [34–37] and social sys-
tems [38, 39]. Moreover, the evolutionary dynamics of this
game is theoretically very well understood, both in infinite as
well as in finite populations [2, 13, 14, 40–42]. Here we focus
on a generic Rock-Scissors-Paper game with payoff matrix


R S P
R 0 s
2
−1
S −1 0 2 + s
P 1+s
3
−1 0

, (16)
which avoids artificial symmetries. According to the repli-
cator equation, the game exhibits saddle node fixed points at
x = 1, y = 1, and z = 1 − x − y = 1 as well as an interior
fixed point at xˆ =
(
1
2
, 1
3
, 1
6
)
, independent of the parameter s
but s controls the stability of xˆ. For s > 1, xˆ is a stable fo-
cus and an unstable focus for s < 1. We do not consider the
non-generic case of s = 1, which exhibits closed orbits [2].
Let us first analyze the fixation probabilities and the fixa-
tion times for the case without mutations µ = 0 for a game
with s = 1.4, such that xˆ is an attractor. The replicator equa-
tion, obtained in the limitN →∞, predicts that fixation never
occurs and that the population evolves towards xˆ, see Fig. 2a.
However, in the stochastic system ultimately two strategies are
lost, see Fig. 2b, c. Most importantly, the sample trajectories
generated by the stochastic differential equation (5) in Fig. 2b
do not exhibit any qualitative differences when compared to
individual based simulations, Fig. 2c. As a complementary
scenario, we consider a game with s = 0.8, such that xˆ is a
repellor. According to the replicator equation trajectories now
spiral away from xˆ towards the boundaries of the simplex and
approach a heteroclinic cycle. The probabilities that the pop-
ulation reaches any one of the three homogenous absorbing
states in either scenario is shown in Fig. 3 together with the
average time to fixation.
In all cases excellent agreement between the Langevin
framework (5) and individual based simulations is obtained.
Note that largerN not only improve the approximation Eq. (5)
but also result in a performance gain as compared to individ-
ual based simulations. More specifically, the computational
effort scales linearly with population size for simulations but
remains constant when integrating Eq. (5) numerically.
For non-vanishing mutation rates, µ > 0, absorption is no
longer possible and the boundary of the simplex becomes re-
pelling. Fig. 4 depicts the average frequencies of each strate-
gic type as a function of µ. For small µ the population can
still get trapped for considerable time along the boundary,
which results in systematic deviations between the stochas-
tic differential equation (5) and individual based simulations,
a
b
c
x y
z
x y
z
x y
z
FIG. 2. Comparison of trajectories for the a deterministic case
(replicator equation), b stochastic differential equation, Eq. (5), and
c individual based simulations for an RSP interaction with weakly
attracting interior fixed point xˆ with s = 1.4 (c.f. Eq. (16)) and
N = 1000 (in b, c). Stochastic trajectories start close to xˆ and end
at time T = 349.9 (b) and T = 395.8 (c). Simulations can also be
performed online at [43].
Fig. 4. More specifically, for µ < 1/N the deviations in-
crease with decreasing µ but the agreement remains excellent
for µ > 1/N . This threshold simply means that for larger µ
the time spent along the boundary can be neglected. In the
limit N → ∞ the replicator-mutator Eq. (5) exhibits a stable
limit cycle [44].
VI. DISCUSSION
Evolutionary dynamics can be implemented in multiple
ways. In particular, if only two types are present, the dynamics
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FIG. 3. Probability of absorption and time to absorption (in the
absence of mutations, µ = 0). a, c Probability to reach one of the
three absorbing homogenous states of rock (solid line, ), scissors
(dashed line, N), or paper (dotted line, ) as well as b, d the as-
sociated time to absorption for rock as a function of the population
size N with a stable (top row, s = 1.4) and unstable (bottom row,
s = 0.8) interior fixed point xˆ. If xˆ is an attractor (a, b) it may take
exceedingly long times for large N until the population reaches an
absorbing state – even though this will inevitably occur. Because of
this results are only shown up to N = 3000. No such limitations
occur if xˆ is a repellor. The symbols indicate results from individ-
ual based simulations. Error bars and grey shaded areas indicate the
standard deviation of the mean for simulations and stochastic cal-
culations, respectively. Simulation results and results based on the
stochastic differential equation Eq. (5) were both averaged over 105
independent runs.
reduces to a single dimension and is typically solvable analyt-
ically, even if the population is finite and demographic noise
is present. If more than two types are present, it is signifi-
cantly more challenging to describe the dynamics analytically.
When the mutation rates are sufficiently small [33], there are
typically at most two types present at any time, thus leading to
situations which justify simpler tools based on the interaction
of two types. In the limit of infinite populations, determinis-
tic differential equations arise and can be used to describe the
system even when the population size is large, but finite. How-
ever, it is more challenging to incorporate noise in this case.
Here, we have proposed a way to address this issue by deriv-
ing a Langevin equation for more than two types. For large
populations, it is typically much more efficient to solve these
equations numerically than to resort to individual based sim-
ulations. A detailed performance comparison is shown in Fig.
5. Computational costs of simulations increase slowly with
the number of strategic types, ∼ d1/2, but increase with the
population size as N2. In contrast, SDE’s are essentially un-
affected by N , but computational costs arise from repeatedly
solving for eigenvalues and eigenvectors of B(x). In theory,
analytical solutions are available for d ≤ 5 but are probably
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FIG. 4. Average frequency (solid line) and standard deviation (grey
shaded area) of the three strategies rock (a, b), scissors (c, d), and
paper (e, f) as a function of the mutation rate µ for small (left col-
umn, N = 100) and large populations (right column, N = 105)
with a stable interior fixed point xˆ, s = 1.4, based on Eq. (5). For
comparison, symbols and error bars depict results from individual
based simulations. No simulation results are shown for N = 105 be-
cause of prohibitive computational efforts. Simulations and Eq. (5)
are in excellent agreement for µ & 1/N but for smaller µ substan-
tial deviations occur (see text for details). Stochastic fluctuations
decrease with increasing N and for N = 105 the population spends
most of the time in the close vicinity of xˆ. Simulation results and re-
sults based on the stochastic differential equation Eq. (5) were both
averaged over 1010 time steps after a relaxation time of 106 steps
(dt = 0.01 for the Langevin equation).
meaningful in practice only for d = 2, 3 and numerical meth-
ods are required for d > 3, which scale with d3 [45]. To
illustrate this, for the data point N = 10000 in Fig. 3c, d the
simulations required approximately two months (1418 hours)
to complete as compared to 49 minutes for the corresponding
calculation based on stochastic differential equations, which
corresponds to a 1700-fold performance gain. However, if
only a small number of one type is present in a population our
approach does not work well unless there are no mutations
7FIG. 5. (color online) Performance comparison of individual based
simulations (IBS) versus stochastic differential equations (SDE). a
ratio of the CPU times CPUSDE/CPUIBS as a function of the popu-
lation size, N , and the number of strategic types, d. The bold contour
indicates equal performance. For small N and large d IBS are faster
(left of solid line), but for larger N and smaller d SDE are faster
(right of solid line). Each contour indicates a performance difference
of one order of magnitude. Note that IBS for d = 2, 3 are based
on analytical calculations of the eigenvalues/eigenvectors of B(x),
which requires substantially less time and hence explains the dis-
continuity in the contours. b computational time with d = 10 as a
function of N for IBS and SDE. As a reference for the scaling N2
and a constant are shown. c computational time with N = 5000
as a function of d for IBS and SDE. As a reference for the scaling
d1/2 and d3 are shown. For a proper scaling argument much larger
d are required but already d = 100 far exceeds typical evolutionary
models and hence is only of limited relevance in the current context.
All comparisons use a constant payoff matrix and the local update
process [8] (such thatAk(x) = 0 and γ(pij , pik) = 1/2), a mutation
rate of 1/N and are based on at least 1000 time steps as well as at
least one minute running time. CPU time is measured in millisec-
onds required to calculate 1000 time steps. The time increment for
the SDE is dt = 0.01.
or the product of the population size and the mutation rate is
sufficiently high, Nµ > 1, such that the time spent along the
boundary becomes negligible, cf. Fig. 4.
In summary, our approach establishes a transparent link be-
tween deterministic models and individual-based simulations
of evolutionary processes. Moreover, the resulting stochastic
differential equations provide substantial speed-up compared
to simulations, and therefore may serve well in the investiga-
tion of multidimensional evolutionary dynamics.
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